TAPV- The Future of Canada's Reconnaissance Procurement

TAPV- The Future of Canada's Reconnaissance Procurement

In World War II shortly after the Battle of Normandy, Canadian light-infantry units coming from Juno Beach and pushing into Holland/Belgium engaged and destroyed elite mechanized units of Hitler's elite Waffen SS.  This storied feat was accomplished with a mixture of superior information sharing, logistics, communication, infantry doctrine and superior period anti-armour equipment.  Since that time, Logistics, Light infantry, RSTA (Reconnaissance, Signals, Target Acquisition) units and RSTA technologies have become the mainstay of Canada's contribution to many international efforts ranging from the Koreas to Afghanistan.  Canada has in many cases sent small observer forces, logistical support or peacekeeping missions where a low profile and effectiveness buoyed by information analysis is always necessary.  Advances in reconnaissance doctrine and technology have made Canada's ability to detect, identify and observe the enemy almost unparalleled on (or under) land, sea and air.

Canadian Forces Coyote participating in security exercises under UN mandate in Eritrea.  The Coyote RV has been in use since 1996 in United Nations/ NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and in Kosovo. Canadian deployments include Kananaskis for the 28th G8 summit, Huntsville for the 36th G8 summit and the G-20 Toronto summit. The Coyote reconnaissance vehicle currently serves in Afghanistan.

Currently the RV (reconnaissance vehicle) used by the Canadian Forces is the Coyote.  The Coyote RV features a troop-transport cabin that can move a reconnaissance or C4 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers) team.  While strong overall as a tactical platform, the Coyote suffers from key weaknesses:  First and foremost is the age of the vehicle.  At 15 tonnes and built on the ubiquitous 8x8 MOWAG PIRANHA  chassis of the LAV-25 used by the USMC (United States Marine Corps) as an IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) the Coyote is heavy and difficult to transport.  The large turret is challenging to remove/replace quickly when moved by C-130 Hercules.  The Coyote  is wheeled making it a good choice for OOTW (Operations Other Than War) particularly where preservation of local infrastructure for peacemaking or nation building is desirable. 

Because of the age of the vehicle, the light armoring on its chassis requires constant field-upgrading. There were serious high-level discussions within the DND about replacing the platform.  When exposed to roadside bombs, improvised munitions and landmines (which inflicted the proportionally highest rate of casualties during the Afghanistan mission) the Coyote did not prove itself and underscored the importance of a new reconnaissance vehicle with casualty-prevention features as well as tactical versatility.

HMMWV in Iraq

The US Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations Command have been using a variety of vehicles in the reconnaissance role.  Armoured reconnaissance is conducted using tracked M3A1 Bradley IFVs or wheeled LAV-25's.  Infantry reconnaissance is conducted with the lightly armoured HMMWV, or the wheeled Stryker RV (incidentally built on the LAVIII chassis manufactured by Canada's General Dynamics Land Systems).  In 2008 the American DOD (Department of Defence) initiated the second phase of a procurement contest seeking a replacement for its aging HMMWV fleet with an emphasis on reconnaissance/communication capabilities.  

The JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle) program was commissioned to find a suitable replacement to the HMMWV.  As a stopgap measure, the HMMWV and in many cases-- heavier combat vehicles were replaced with the MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicle of which there are numerous competing models, making standardization of doctrine or equipment between joint or international forces particularly difficult.

RG-31 Nyala in Afghanistan

Bogged down by complex requirements, politics and contract lobbying, the JLTV program has yet to produce a tangible replacement meeting all the needs of the US Army, USMC and USSOCOM.  Canada in the meantime has forged ahead with design, testing and procurement.  Canada bought 75 of the RG-31 Nyala an MRAP produced in South Africa.  While robust and versatile, the Nyala suffers from low survivability in IED attacks and are more expensive to maintain than an indigenous vehicle.

Enter the TAPV. On June 8, 2012 the Department of National Defence announced a winner in its performance trials for a Coyote successor.  The Textron TAPV (Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle) was hands down a winner.  An almost $1bn contract was established by the DND to ensure procurement and delivery of these vehicles by 2014.The TAPV incorporates numerous new features into its design.   

Coming back to design and history, the vehicle is significant because it is based on a German design.  Our light combat car is the Mercedes G-Wagen, produced initially for the Bundeswehr.  Our main battle tank is a semi-indigenous adaptation of the German Leopard 2A4 with a few top-tier Leopard 2A6M tanks on loan from the Netherlands.  Even the vehicle's name is a triumph of marketing.  TAPV is pronounced as 'TAP-VEE'.  A light-armoured vehicle in use as troop-transport and reconnaissance platform by the Bundeswehr is the TPz Fuchs, commonly referred to as a 'TAP-ZEE' which shares a similar profile and role to the TAPV.  Given the integration of German-developed weapons systems into the Canadian Forces it is safe to say that the similar vehicle nicknames are probably not coincidental.

 The TAPV is developed by Textron Systems Canada a subsidiary of the American company Textron.  An office in Ottawa, Ontario is responsible for overseeing the project to completion.  The preliminary order (due at the latest in 2016) is for 500 vehicles, 200 in reconnaissance pattern and 300 equipped for infantry transport.  Though the design is sourced internationally, as are specific components the vehicles will be produced in Canada at Textron's fabrication plants.

TAPV manufacturer Textron Systems Canada currently employs 2,200 Canadians in manufacturing at its plants which also produce the Cessna model small airplane.

Textron Systems President and Chief Executive Officer Fred Strader was quoted on the company's website as saying: “ “We are honoured that the Department of National Defence and Public Works and Government Services found our team and vehicle best suited to their needs for this important program... ...The Textron TAPV will provide the men and women of the Canadian Army a fully supportable tactical armoured vehicle platform that delivers outstanding performance in the world’s most challenging environments.”

Meanwhile a quote taken from the DND website regarding the TAPV says: "TAPV is a component of the Land Forces Combat Vehicle program which is focused on the renewal of the Army's core equipment platforms as stated in the Canada First Defence Strategy. The TAPV project will deliver a wheeled combat vehicle that will fulfill a wide variety of roles domestically and on the battlefield, including but not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, cargo, and armoured personnel carrier. It will have a high degree of tactical mobility and provide a very high degree of survivability to its crew."  

As an indigenous weapons system, the TAPV offers independence to Canadian interests around the world in that we are not reliant on overseas import (as in the case of the RG-31 and the G-Wagen) for parts or technical support.  As a high-tech vehicle, the TAPV is capable of supporting the advanced satellite communications, optical surveillance and C4 equipment necessary to fight a fourth or fifth generation conflict.  High survivability, excellent tactical mobility, variety of standardized weapon options for the integrated CROWS (Crew Remote Operated Weapon System).    

The design has already been battle proven. To be precise, the TAPV is a Canadian-built version of the M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicle which was adopted by US Army Military Police for force protection/convoy/escort duty.  The Canadian designed TAPV and the current ASV differ in several ways.  The ASV has a one-man turret mounted on the hull while the TAPV's gunner is internal and the weapon system controlled remotely via an electronic interface.  The ASV is also configured to carry a maximum of four personnel while the TAPV has two variants, a reconnaissance variant carrying four and a transport variant carrying 10 (3 crew + 7 passengers).

In his book, "A Soldier First" General(ret.) Rick Hillier (former CDS and Operational Commander for Canadian Forces in Afghanistan talks about the dangers of adapting foreign-built weapons systems for use in Canada. In particular he relates an anecdote about a tank-gunnery competition in Germany where insulated wiring (intended to protect delicate instruments from harsh Canadian winters) were overheated due to a design flaw by the hot German sun.  This in turn threw off the accuracy of the tank's main gun leading to the disqualification of the Canadian team.  Hillier cautions against the 'Canadianization' of platforms and espouses either indigenous development or 'as-is' purchase from foreign suppliers, ideally supported by a maintenance contract.  

In terms of cost, at $500m(CAD) for 500 vehicles and a further $180m(CAD) for ongoing support the TAPV is an excellent choice.  The procurement will stimulate the Canadian economy while also improving Canada's ability to contribute internationally.  This in turn should raise our standing in terms of our international obligations.  Improved international standing of course has its own hidden economic benefits.  Whether or not this will improve Canada's ability to contribute to the UN and improve our standing to the point of regaining a seat as a security-council member, remains to be seen.  Overall this is a good example of the ongoing 're-modernization' of the post-Afghan War Canadian Forces in order to build a stronger, safer society.

Now some critical questions for those of you with experience in these matters:

1) The ASV-M117 currently in use by  American military police is not NBC rated.  Is the Canadian variant going to be fitted with NBC protection?

2) How does the four wheeler design stack up in terms of mobility, stability and reliability against the TpZ Fuchs' six wheels or the LAV III's eight?

3)  How will the side-door access change existing Canadian Forces doctrine for a TIC debus?  Is there an internal ramp to ease the exit with full combat load or are the awkward videos of soldiers getting in and out of the half-gull doors pretty much par for the course as to what our personnel can expect?

CC-130J: There and Back Again

The decision to procure 17 redesigned CC-130J Hercules tactical lift aircraft comes as Canada prepares the draw-down of combat forces in Afghanistan.  These aircraft will be integral to the troop pullout and represent a significant boost in Canada’s overall operational capability.  While not designed to move heavy materiel, the CC-130J can move a significant quantity of personnel, supplies and general light equipment to and from a theatre of operations.

Defence Minister Peter McKay rides proudly atop one of Canada's new CC-130J Hercules
tactical lift aircraft following a ceremony at 8 Wing/CFB Trenton.

When Canada conducted its initial deployment at the onset of the Afghan conflict, troops and equipment were ferried on a limited number of flights by the C-17 Globemaster aircraft operated out of Trenton.  The majority of aerial supply was conducted by rented or borrowed transport aircraft including several flights by aging russian-built heavy-lift charter transports.  Naval logistics to regional ports and joint-shipping with ally nations allowed Canada to move the significant quantities of equipment necessary for sustainment of the 9 year war-effort.  Now, facing the prospect of withdrawal it has become glaringly obvious that the Canadian Forces lack tactical or operational mobility on any significant scale.  One officer compared the scale of the withdrawal to uprooting and relocating a large village or town.

On the tactical level, the high-tech CC-130J’s will be capable of dropping a large quantity of supplies to deployed troops with greatly improved drop precision over previous versions of the same aircraft.  This means that brave men and women in the frontlines will not have to wait as long or have as many complications related to receiving the supplies they need to sustain prolonged engagement.  On two levels then, in the operational sense of enhanced deployment and in the tactical sense of enhanced logistics the CC-130J is a significant boost to Canadian combat effectiveness overall.  In emergency situations, troops and equipment together can be deployed from the new platforms, which incorporate sophisticated global-positioning technology to coordinate drop locations with weather, time or combat variables.

New aircraft in the lift profile also mean the relegation of older C-130 variants to search and rescue, maritime patrol or even civilian operators.  Overall, the improvement of capabilities through this procurement benefits domestic Canada.  The position of Canada as a global player capable of rapid deployment and combat self-sufficiency is much more realistic with these platforms.  The CC-130J plays a prominent role in strengthening not only national sovereignty but also in elevating overall national standing on the world stage.  For an airframe with a 50 year operational history and a reputation for reliability, that modernized versions of the Hercules transport continue to be used is a testament to its quality.

Mistral LHD? Expanding operational deployment capabilities to the Maritime Command

Marine Nationale 3d walkthrough of the BPC Mistral LHD and another French vessel.

The Mistral LHD is a French vessel, the second largest class of ship in the French navy after the Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.  Currently there are two Mistral in service with a third in production and plans being made for ordering a fourth.  The helicopter carrier incorporates massive storage, advanced azimuth propulsion and a top-end electronics warfare suite making it one of the most modern warships in the world.  It is capable of carrying up to 40 LeClerc Main Battle-Tanks (Battalion) and about four-hundred infantry.  The tanks and infantry can be deployed in up to four landing-craft, making the Mistral an effective troop-ship.  While a few other nations around the world have similar carriers, very few countries have the shipbuilding technologies or facilities to undertake massive projects.  The French, very proud of their new carrier have been shopping it around to the Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians in the hopes of finding a buyer.

                The most likely prospective buyer for the Mistral, showing the most interest in acquiring the $600m ship was the Russian Federation.  It was reported in the summer of 2009 that the Russians were looking to purchase two of the French ships, with another planned construction if the order was satisfactory and a fourth vessel to be produced in Russia on the table as well.  This last would not be a simple matter of transferring materiel, but would also involve giving the Russians access to top-secret French naval technologies.  In a spectacular gesture that underscored how much things have changed in the last two decades, the French brought their Mistral to the port at St. Petersburg for an official inspection.  Inclusion of the Mistral in the Baltic fleet would not only enhance the capabilities of Russia to deploy its navalized attack helicopter squadrons there.  It was suggested by a Russian admiral that a Mistral in the Black Sea fleet would have greatly enhanced the federation’s offensive capabilities in its 200* war with Georgia over the breakaway province of South Ossetia.  More to the point, modifications to the hull of the Mistral could result in an ice-reinforced vessel capable of traversing the chill waters of the arctic circle in company with one of Russia’s formidable nuclear-powered icebreakers.

                Canada currently does not possess any comparable vessel to the Mistral and would do well to consider the ship’s contribution to our operational and strategic requirements.  While a large navy is out of the question, the nature of Canada’s overseas involvement is such that an assault-ship could fill a capability gap for the Canadian Forces Maritime Command.  The deployment of small numbers of troops in response to various international crisis situations would benefit greatly from a single vessel which could bring the soldiers to within striking distance and support them.  A modified Mistral could be used to deploy the F-35B Lightning II Joint-Strike Fighter that is currently in the procurement stage, or the Leopard 2A- in support of ground-troops.  Since the unification of our forces into a joint command, the efficiency of operations has been greatly increased and while our strategic need may not call directly for a large standing marine element (like the Marine Corps of our neighbours to the South) our strategic interests could definitely be served with the creation of a maritime deployable task-force that is operationally self-sufficient and sustainable.  Currently the only means of deploying large numbers of troops and materiel is by CC-177 Globemaster III (previously by rented Antonov/Ilyushin).  The ability to deploy on our own schedule, without the need for a large airfield or complex aerial logistics is very important, especially to our participation in multinational coalitions.  The Mistral could be used to deploy the Sea King helicopter (or its much-needed replacement) for everything from search and rescue to combat sustainment.

The battle-damaged INS Hanit sits stricken in port after being
struck by a Hezbollah shore-to-ship missile.

                It’s not that Canada needs to buy this specific vessel.  Developing and building a uniquely Canadian assault ship is an option as well, albeit an expensive one.  One of the Mistral’s major failings is its inability to operate autonomously.  Unlike DDH class (Helicopter-Destroyers) or even ASW equipped vessels with helicopter decks, the Mistral has almost no armament of its own beyond its aircraft complement.  Therefore it is necessary for the Mistral to operate as a prominent flagship in a fleet of ships.  While this may meet the need of asymmetrical warfighting, the recent experiences of Israel in the 2006 war against Hezbollah where a surface-to-surface missile badly crippled an Israeli warship proves that precautions need to be taken in the deployment of vulnerable maritime platforms.  In a conventional war, such as the engagement between the British and the Argentinian militaries over the Falkland islands, there is a precedent for exocet/harpoon missile attacks against vulnerable ships, especially directed towards the ‘carriers’ which form the nexus of a modern fleet.  It falls to the escorting vessels to provide an effective screen against these and other threats.  Needless to say, any upgrading of Canadian capabilities with a Mistral Class or similar vessel would require an upgrade to the infrastructure and tactical capabilities of the Canadian Forces Maritime Command as a whole.

Autonomous Procurement - Canada, the F35B Lightning II and viable alternatives

When the Canadian Government announced in July that it intended to purchase 65 new F35B Lightning II airframes as part of the Joint-Strike Fighter procurement, my first thought was of impending political disaster. Procurement in Canada is something of a political football, running right back to the foundation of the Canadian navy playing a decisive role in the 1911 Borden victory. Maybe it’s a national ethos, but Canadians don’t seem to want to spoil themselves or their military. Simultaneous to that though, they will figuratively guillotine any politician who is seen as not doing enough to support the valued troops. It’s a conundrum that while Canadians on a national level seem to dislike war, we are simultaneously very supportive of the professional few who are willing to wage it on our behalf.

The Joint Strike Fighter procurement has the goal of replacing Canada’s obsolescent CF-18 Hornets with a new state-of-the-art fighter-bomber or multirole fighter. The program itself sought to develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft which was capable of precision delivery of air-to-surface munitions and could penetrate deep into hostile airspace with a stealthy profile. The resulting F35B Lightning II and its variants (STOL, CTOL, CV) have a relatively stealthy profile, high-performance design and meet the requirements of the program. They are also heinously expensive both in material cost and maintenance. Still, compared to the even more expensive and labour-intensive F-22 Raptor which was developed by the United States Air-Force to fit the air-superiority role. While the F-22 procurement has run into some snags, the F-35B procurement is advancing more or less on schedule. The Canadian government’s interest in acquiring 65 of the airframes is a derivative result of the longstanding Canadian financial contributions to the research and development program.

Still, as much of an opportunity as the JSF procurement offers Canada to upgrade the operational capabilities of the Royal Canadian Air-Force, opposition parties in parliament have challenged the veracity of claims that the F35B is the best platform for both the defense of the Canadian nation. They also challenge its stated contribution to the projection of Canada’s military capabilities in theatres of both contemporary and futuristic. What are Canada’s immediate and long-term strategic needs? That the air force plays a prominent role in Canadian defence and security is undeniable. The Canadian nation is vast and in its northern latitudes, relatively underdeveloped. This combination of huge spaces which are indefensible by conventional means along with an incredibly low population-to-territory ratio makes the maintenance of a large standing army untenable. The lengthy coastlines and only partially navigable internal and territorial seas of the Arctic region make the procurement and deployment of either a littoral or blue-water navy difficult as well. Besides that, Canada’s global role as a middle-power which projects limited military force in support of international joint operations makes a navy (traditionally the mainstay of hegemonic force-projection) unnecessary. The obvious solution to the requirements of territorial defence, sovereignty assertion and international participation is a much-needed upgrade to the Air-force. High-speed modern aircraft can transit the huge nation quickly, participate in joint maritime operations with the United-States and launch from airfields around the world as part of a multinational task force in times of crisis.

Much of the outcry about the F35B procurement stems from the perception that the government went ahead with the purchases without a competitive bidding process. The lack of competition or official trials might put our services at a disadvantage in wartime if we simply buy what is available without ‘shopping around’ so to speak. While these concerns are valid, the acquisition of 65 F35B Lightning II’s has been conducted following a series of high-level recommendations and in correlation with Canada’s participation in the development program. Our government is in possession of performance data which qualifies them to make a decision, even if the study excludes other possible platforms. The obvious contenders with the F35B are the ‘Eurofighter Typhoon’ and the ‘F/A-18 Super-Hornet’.


The Eurofighter Typhoon (right) is undeniably the superior platform to the F35B for munitions-delivery. It has double (13) the munitions hardpoints (pylons to which missiles or bombs are attached) and fully loaded, almost triples the precison-armament capabilities of the F-35B. It is however an older design and amongst other things does not possess a stealthy profile or the sophisticated electronics suite of a 21st century aircraft. The Typhoon is in service with the UK RAF, the Luftwaffe and various other European governments. Saudi-Arabia has also signed a procurement deal for the airframe. The aircraft is reliable and at $63 million (USD) /unit is affordable as well. As a choice for middle-powers in the Eurozone or nations with a need for an effective ground-attack aircraft, the Typhoon is an obvious contender. Its range and combat-radius also exceed the F35 by a good deal (over 200nm).


The F/A-18 Super-Hornet  (right) is a more advanced platform than the Typhoon offering limited stealth capabilities while possessing a greater number of hardpoints than the F35B making it a superior munitions-delivery platform. Its combat radius as a multirole aircraft developed for carrier deployment is comparable to the F35. The cost per unit is the most affordable of the immediate options at $60.3 million per unit. Additionally, interchangeability in some parts between Canada’s existing CF-18s and the F/A-18 Super-Hornet makes maintenance easier and decreases the personnel requirements as current jet-mechanics would require far fewer qualifications to work on the upgraded design.

International operators of the Super-Hornet are developed nations like the UK and Australia. Records indicate that India, Saudi Arabia and Brazil have been considering the aircraft as part of their own procurement agendas giving evidence that it is a sophisticated and high-performance budget alternative for nations who need power at a reasonable price. The alternative platforms have been declared unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, and the Canadian Government has forged ahead with the planned procurement. This is taking place at a time of global economic uncertainty, and on a purely fincancial basis, it seems untenable to buy a complement of 65 aircraft for $9Billion ($138 million/unit) when only $4 billion would buy an equivalent number of Super Hornets or same number of Eurofighter Typhoons.


There is of course an unexplored alternative which bears mention in these circumstances. The company British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) announced only weeks before Canada’s procurement intentions were declared that they had completed production of the first in a line of stealthy Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV). Named ‘Taranis’ (at left) for the Celtic god of thunder, this aircraft promises to revolutionize the way air-wars are conducted and vastly expand the capabilities of any nation which chooses to field these advanced vehicles. The program development cost for the Taranis was $214 million (CAD) and was conducted under the auspices of maintaining British sovereignty over its aerospace development industry while simultaneously meeting the needs of the contemporary and near-future battlespace. What is unique about the UCAV is that while they do not possess a human pilot, they also rely largely on sophisticated electronic-warfare systems to enhance interoperability between operational platforms in a given theatre.

Combat drones have been in use in a ground-attack role for quite some time and have produced very promising results in counter-insurgency operations (COIN). In a war with a near-peer a nation fielding UCAV’s could expect the emergent-behaviour capabilities of the unmanned platform (greatly enhanced situational awareness via network-centric communications leading to spontaneous emergent ‘swarming’ capabilities) to supplement for any shortcomings such as population or procurement shortages in other areas. The UCAV has also seen tests by the US Navy as a carrier-launched alternative (below right), simulations of which produced very promising results during recent wargames. Boeing is developing on its own dollar a stealth UCAV for sale, independent of the normal development process.

A US military publication ‘Joint Vision 2020’ dealing with the subject of capabilities vs. roles for the US Military in the 21st century projected somewhat optimistically that by 2020 90% of combat air missions are expected to be unmanned. Given this bleak outlook on the future of piloted aircraft, why the Canadian Government is forging ahead with the purchase of expensive platforms which may be rendered obsolete even before their scheduled delivery in 2016 is a mystery. A short-term investment in a research and development program for a uniquely Canadian UCAV would provide an immediate injection in the Aerospace industry in this country and grow the national economy. Additionally, it would reduce in the long term the personnel needs of the air-force as the training of pilots has traditionally been a lengthy and costly expenditure. Maintenance and transportation jobs would be created and the overall net benefit for the Canadian economy would be undoubtedly positive. Additionally, concerns about interoperability with other NATO or international partners could be overcome through the development of sophisticated networking technologies. Additionally, not containing a human pilot, these aircraft can naturally built to a more exacting performance standard, being capable of performing maneuvers and achieving speeds which would be detrimental to human pilot survival. In short, the UCAV is a more than viable alternative to the bloated F35B procurement.