When the Canadian Government announced in July that it intended to purchase 65 new F35B Lightning II airframes as part of the Joint-Strike Fighter procurement, my first thought was of impending political disaster. Procurement in Canada is something of a political football, running right back to the foundation of the Canadian navy playing a decisive role in the 1911 Borden victory. Maybe it’s a national ethos, but Canadians don’t seem to want to spoil themselves or their military. Simultaneous to that though, they will figuratively guillotine any politician who is seen as not doing enough to support the valued troops. It’s a conundrum that while Canadians on a national level seem to dislike war, we are simultaneously very supportive of the professional few who are willing to wage it on our behalf.
The Joint Strike Fighter procurement has the goal of replacing Canada’s obsolescent CF-18 Hornets with a new state-of-the-art fighter-bomber or multirole fighter. The program itself sought to develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft which was capable of precision delivery of air-to-surface munitions and could penetrate deep into hostile airspace with a stealthy profile. The resulting F35B Lightning II and its variants (STOL, CTOL, CV) have a relatively stealthy profile, high-performance design and meet the requirements of the program. They are also heinously expensive both in material cost and maintenance. Still, compared to the even more expensive and labour-intensive F-22 Raptor which was developed by the United States Air-Force to fit the air-superiority role. While the F-22 procurement has run into some snags, the F-35B procurement is advancing more or less on schedule. The Canadian government’s interest in acquiring 65 of the airframes is a derivative result of the longstanding Canadian financial contributions to the research and development program.
Still, as much of an opportunity as the JSF procurement offers Canada to upgrade the operational capabilities of the Royal Canadian Air-Force, opposition parties in parliament have challenged the veracity of claims that the F35B is the best platform for both the defense of the Canadian nation. They also challenge its stated contribution to the projection of Canada’s military capabilities in theatres of both contemporary and futuristic. What are Canada’s immediate and long-term strategic needs? That the air force plays a prominent role in Canadian defence and security is undeniable. The Canadian nation is vast and in its northern latitudes, relatively underdeveloped. This combination of huge spaces which are indefensible by conventional means along with an incredibly low population-to-territory ratio makes the maintenance of a large standing army untenable. The lengthy coastlines and only partially navigable internal and territorial seas of the Arctic region make the procurement and deployment of either a littoral or blue-water navy difficult as well. Besides that, Canada’s global role as a middle-power which projects limited military force in support of international joint operations makes a navy (traditionally the mainstay of hegemonic force-projection) unnecessary. The obvious solution to the requirements of territorial defence, sovereignty assertion and international participation is a much-needed upgrade to the Air-force. High-speed modern aircraft can transit the huge nation quickly, participate in joint maritime operations with the United-States and launch from airfields around the world as part of a multinational task force in times of crisis.
Much of the outcry about the F35B procurement stems from the perception that the government went ahead with the purchases without a competitive bidding process. The lack of competition or official trials might put our services at a disadvantage in wartime if we simply buy what is available without ‘shopping around’ so to speak. While these concerns are valid, the acquisition of 65 F35B Lightning II’s has been conducted following a series of high-level recommendations and in correlation with Canada’s participation in the development program. Our government is in possession of performance data which qualifies them to make a decision, even if the study excludes other possible platforms. The obvious contenders with the F35B are the ‘Eurofighter Typhoon’ and the ‘F/A-18 Super-Hornet’.
The Eurofighter Typhoon (right) is undeniably the superior platform to the F35B for munitions-delivery. It has double (13) the munitions hardpoints (pylons to which missiles or bombs are attached) and fully loaded, almost triples the precison-armament capabilities of the F-35B. It is however an older design and amongst other things does not possess a stealthy profile or the sophisticated electronics suite of a 21st century aircraft. The Typhoon is in service with the UK RAF, the Luftwaffe and various other European governments. Saudi-Arabia has also signed a procurement deal for the airframe. The aircraft is reliable and at $63 million (USD) /unit is affordable as well. As a choice for middle-powers in the Eurozone or nations with a need for an effective ground-attack aircraft, the Typhoon is an obvious contender. Its range and combat-radius also exceed the F35 by a good deal (over 200nm).
The F/A-18 Super-Hornet (right) is a more advanced platform than the Typhoon offering limited stealth capabilities while possessing a greater number of hardpoints than the F35B making it a superior munitions-delivery platform. Its combat radius as a multirole aircraft developed for carrier deployment is comparable to the F35. The cost per unit is the most affordable of the immediate options at $60.3 million per unit. Additionally, interchangeability in some parts between Canada’s existing CF-18s and the F/A-18 Super-Hornet makes maintenance easier and decreases the personnel requirements as current jet-mechanics would require far fewer qualifications to work on the upgraded design.
International operators of the Super-Hornet are developed nations like the UK and Australia. Records indicate that India, Saudi Arabia and Brazil have been considering the aircraft as part of their own procurement agendas giving evidence that it is a sophisticated and high-performance budget alternative for nations who need power at a reasonable price. The alternative platforms have been declared unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, and the Canadian Government has forged ahead with the planned procurement. This is taking place at a time of global economic uncertainty, and on a purely fincancial basis, it seems untenable to buy a complement of 65 aircraft for $9Billion ($138 million/unit) when only $4 billion would buy an equivalent number of Super Hornets or same number of Eurofighter Typhoons.
There is of course an unexplored alternative which bears mention in these circumstances. The company British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) announced only weeks before Canada’s procurement intentions were declared that they had completed production of the first in a line of stealthy Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV). Named ‘Taranis’ (at left) for the Celtic god of thunder, this aircraft promises to revolutionize the way air-wars are conducted and vastly expand the capabilities of any nation which chooses to field these advanced vehicles. The program development cost for the Taranis was $214 million (CAD) and was conducted under the auspices of maintaining British sovereignty over its aerospace development industry while simultaneously meeting the needs of the contemporary and near-future battlespace. What is unique about the UCAV is that while they do not possess a human pilot, they also rely largely on sophisticated electronic-warfare systems to enhance interoperability between operational platforms in a given theatre.
Combat drones have been in use in a ground-attack role for quite some time and have produced very promising results in counter-insurgency operations (COIN). In a war with a near-peer a nation fielding UCAV’s could expect the emergent-behaviour capabilities of the unmanned platform (greatly enhanced situational awareness via network-centric communications leading to spontaneous emergent ‘swarming’ capabilities) to supplement for any shortcomings such as population or procurement shortages in other areas. The UCAV has also seen tests by the US Navy as a carrier-launched alternative (below right), simulations of which produced very promising results during recent wargames. Boeing is developing on its own dollar a stealth UCAV for sale, independent of the normal development process.
A US military publication ‘Joint Vision 2020’ dealing with the subject of capabilities vs. roles for the US Military in the 21st century projected somewhat optimistically that by 2020 90% of combat air missions are expected to be unmanned. Given this bleak outlook on the future of piloted aircraft, why the Canadian Government is forging ahead with the purchase of expensive platforms which may be rendered obsolete even before their scheduled delivery in 2016 is a mystery. A short-term investment in a research and development program for a uniquely Canadian UCAV would provide an immediate injection in the Aerospace industry in this country and grow the national economy. Additionally, it would reduce in the long term the personnel needs of the air-force as the training of pilots has traditionally been a lengthy and costly expenditure. Maintenance and transportation jobs would be created and the overall net benefit for the Canadian economy would be undoubtedly positive. Additionally, concerns about interoperability with other NATO or international partners could be overcome through the development of sophisticated networking technologies. Additionally, not containing a human pilot, these aircraft can naturally built to a more exacting performance standard, being capable of performing maneuvers and achieving speeds which would be detrimental to human pilot survival. In short, the UCAV is a more than viable alternative to the bloated F35B procurement.
